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Reviewed by Alix Toublanc•

I. INTRODUCTION
The perspectives ofFrench lawyers concerning international law and international
institutions are formed largely by the basic course in public international law that they
took as law students. Students in the course attend formal lectures by the professor
(cours magistraux) and often supplementary section meetings, or tutorials, with
instructors (travaux diriges ), as well as read all or part of a basic textbook (manue/) in
public international law and other assigned materials.
One way to gain insight into the fundamental ways of thinking about international
law of French lawyers and law-trained officials is to take a close look at the manuels
that they studied as law students. Are these manuels narrow and technically focused,
limiting inquiry to the text of treaties and other authoritative sources of international
law? Or are they broad-ranging and policy-oriented, opening avenues to consideration

• Maitre de conferences, l'Universite de Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne).
I. The first difficulty in writing this article was selecting the textbooks to analyze. It was solved by
using the two criteria of representation and diversity of perspective. The analysis was thus limited to those
textbooks used most by students that also presented the personal views of the author or authors. Although
other textbooks are not discussed, the ones that are should provide a representative overview of the diversity
of French doctrine.
2. Dominique Carreau is a professor at the Universite de Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne).
3. Jean Combacau and Serge Sur ("Combacau-Sur'') are professors at the Universite de Paris II
(Pantheon-Assas ).
4. Emmanuel Decaux is a professor at the Universite de Paris II (Pantheon-Assas).
S. Pierre-Marie Dupuy is a professor at the European University Institute and the Universite de Paris
II (Pantheon-Assas).
6. Patrick Daillier and Alain Pellet ("Daillier-Pellet") are professors at the Universite de Paris
(Nanterre). Alain Pellet is a member and former President of the United Nations International Law
Commission.
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of a wide variety of factors? Do they advocate and employ methods which privilege
logical and deductive reasoning for arriving at solutions to legal problems? Or do they
direct attention to analysis that looks also to the purpose of rules? Do they present
international law from a policy-neutral perspective? Or do they engage in judgments
about existing rules or suggest the development of new rules? Do they conceive
international law as state-centered? Or do they see it rather from a "world community"
perspective? These are some of the questions which will be addressed in this article.
Presenting French textbooks to the American internationalist public logically leads
one to try to explain how they differ from the casebooks used by American law
students. 7 This, however, raises a further, implicit question: whether there is sufficient
unity in French doctrine to justify a presentation of the underlying spirit of French
textbooks as a whole.
The first question is relatively easy to answer because there are clear differences
in the form of French manuels and American casebooks: French textbooks are almost
always smaller in size than American casebooks. The main reason is that, as a general
rule, they do not include the documents and annexes which appear in abundance in
American casebooks, i.e., sizeable extracts from case law and the writings of scholars.
In France, these are simply quoted and summarized by the author of the textbook
because these sorts of documents are more often provided in handouts distributed to
students to prepare tutorials rather than directly included in the textbooks themselves. 8
The second point appears more difficult to resolve: is there sufficient substantive
unity between these textbooks to justify presenting them as a whole and developing
''the" French concept of international law, which is probably what the American
internationalist reading this review is hoping to find? Of course, there are many
similarities, especially in the presentation of the subject in general. Each textbook
commences with a more or less detailed study of the history of international law and
a description of the various schools of thought. This is followed, although the order
may vary, by a study of the relations between international and national law, sources,
subjects, the application of international law in the international and national legal
orders, the responsibility of states, the law of peace and international security, and the
regime of international spaces, which is particularly developed in the Combacau-Sur
textbook. However, the latter excludes economic questions relating to trade
regulation, investment, and development law, whereas these matters are presented by
Pierre-Marie Dupuy and amply developed in the Daillier-Pellet textbook. CombacauSur, Daillier-Pellet, and Pierre-Marie Dupuy also analyze questions relating to
environmental law. Human rights, another sensitive subject of contemporary inter-

7. For a critical review of the leading contemporaryAmerican internationallaw casebooks, see David
J. Bederman, International Law Casebooks: Tradition, Revision, and Pedagogy, 98 AM. J. INT'LL. 200
(2004) (book review).
8. The exception to this rule is Emmanuel Decaux's textbook, DROITINTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC,which
includes many extracts from case law and doctrine. French law students also have access to important
documents,like the U .N. Charter, Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties, many U .N. General Assembly
and Security Council Resolutions, etc. in PIERRE-MARIE
DUPUY,LES GRANDSTEXTESDE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC
(4th ed. 2004). In fact, Professor Dupuy indicates in the Preface to this work that
it is cross-referencedto his manuel, and his manuel is cross-referencedto his collection of documents. In
this sense it resembles a documentary supplementto an American casebook.
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national law, is discussed in all the textbooks, but particularly well developed in those
of Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Daillier-Pellet.
Nevertheless, making a list of the subjects common to all the authors clearly does
not allow us to determine whether there is any unity of doctrine: a "French concept"
of international law. The way in which these subjects are treated will be the determining factor. It is the doctrinal conclusions drawn by their authors from case law and
practice that will reveal any unity or important variations in the principal French public
international law textbooks.
In fact, there are two main sorts of variation in French textbooks. They first
become evident at an early stage, when the authors define the object of study and the
methodology. Part I of this article will therefore address the questions of definition
and methodology. Differences among French textbooks also result from more substantive theoretical disagreements concerning the nature and meaning of international
law. These disagreements relate to differing views with respect to objectivism 9 and
voluntarism, 10 which will be addressed in Part II of this article. Thus, although it will
not be possible to present American readers with a unitary French concept of international law, they may, at least, be impressed by the richness and diversity of French
doctrine.
II. PRELIMINARY PROBLEMS OF DEFINffiON AND SCOPE OF ANALYSIS

The diversity of French doctrine is evident in the very first pages of the textbooks
we are considering with their different definitions of international law. This is
confirmed by varying conceptions of the appropriate scope of the study, although one
should note the common concern of all authors to present the most neutral analysis
possible.

A. The Problem of Defining International Law
The content of a textbook on international law logically depends, above all, on the
definition of the subject to be studied that is chosen by the authors. As there is no
objective definition of international law, one may prefer a more or less strict, or more
or less classic definition extending from the law governing interstate relations to the
law governing transnational phenomena more generally. Unsurprisingly, one finds a
wide variety of definitions in French textbooks, from the most classic to the broadest,
which exercise a decisive influence on the substantive content of the textbooks and the
subjects studied. Although there is no real unity in French doctrine on this point, it is
possible to observe a dominant tendency.
The most restrained definition may be found in the textbook by Jean Combacau
and Serge Sur: "Public international law is the law produced through relations between
two or more States." 11 The classicism of this definition already foreshadows the

9. Objectivism determines that the binding force oflaw is based on a reference to something outside
will, outside the frame of Kelsenian formalism, on objective elements based on the nature of the society or
on social needs which the State can only record. Positive law is considered as the more or less successful
translation of objective law, which preexists and gives the binding force to positive law.
I 0. Voluntarism determines that the binding force of international law is based on the consent of the
subjects of law, especially the sovereign States.
11. I JEANCOMBACAU
& SERGESUR,DROITINTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC15 (Montchrestien, 6th ed. 2004)

HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 590 2006

2006)

REVIEW ESSAY

591

consequences for questions such as the sources and subjects of international law. A
wider definition is provided in Pierre-Marie Dupuy's textbook: "International law is
composed of the whole range of rules and bodies intended to govern international
society. " 12 A similar perspective can be found in the definition adopted by Alain Pellet
and Patrick Daillier: "International law is defined as the law applicable to international
society." 13 The implicit intention not to limit international law to a purely interstate
phenomenon is patent in these definitions. Emmanuel Decaux states this intention
explicitly: "International law is no longer interstate law, limited to relations between
a closed club of States; it is the law of international society as a whole, governing a
range of subjects whose transnational relations are constantly increasing." 14
Dominique Carreau even considers that one can no longer use the term "public international law," as law defining relations between states, because this no longer
corresponds to the state of contemporary international society. The author would
prefer to adopt the position of Philip Jessup, asserting that we should now use the term
''transnational law," i.e., "all law which regulates actions or events that transcend
national borders." 15 This wide range of definitions, from the most Westphalian to the
most contemporary, testifies to the great diversity of French doctrine. The consequences of this diversity in definition are significant.
The first group of definitions dictates a strictly limited field of study, excluding
any study of international relations, private international law, or transnational law.
Jean Combacau and Serge Sur thus consider that the "rules governing private transstate relations and rules of any origin that do not stem from the state legal order" do
not come within the ambit of their study. 16 Alain Pellet and Patrick Daillier's textbook
presents a less strictly interstate definition of international law, although they explicitly
indicate that it excludes private international law and lex mercatoria. 11 Dominique
Carreau's textbook counters this dominant tendency, stating that it will also "include
those areas coming within the French conception of private international law, such as
international contracts and the relations between States and individuals." 18 Accordingly, the author covers the question of agreements between non-state authorities: 9
Emmanuel Decaux 's textbook stands out for its inclusion of ''the forces and limits
of law in the 21st century world, including issues relating to globalization and
American unilateralism, the instrumentalization of international justice and the
challenges ofterrorism." 20 This approach is both wider and more political. It is less
strictly technical, and the frontier with international relations is less marked. Thus,

(my translation).
12. 2 PIERRE-MARIE
DUPUY,DROITINTERNATIONAL
PUBLICI (Dalloz, 7th ed. 2004) (my translation).
13. ALAINPELLET&PATRICKDAILLIER,DROITINTERNATIONALPUBLIC
35 (L.G.D.J., 7th ed. 2002) (my
translation).
14. EMMANUEL
DECAUX,DROITINTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC14 (Dalloz, 4th ed. 2004) (my translation).
15. DOMINIQUE
CARREAU,
DROITINTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC34 (Pedone, 8th ed. 2004); see also PHILIP
C. JESSUP,TRANSNATIONAL
LAW(1956).
16. COMBACAU
& SUR, supra note 11, at 17.
17. DAILLIER& PELLET,supra note 13, at x. Lex mercatoria was a system of customary law that
regulated the dealings of mariners and merchants until the 17th century. It's principles formed the basis of
the Uniform Commercial Code. BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
893 (7th ed. 1999).
18. CARREAU,
supra note 15, at 34 (my translation).
19. Id. at 175-98.
20. DECAUX,supra note 14, at front cover.
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from the outset, it appears clear that there is no unity in French doctrine, since there
is not even agreement on the subject of a textbook on international law.
B. A Common Positivist Methodology

What do French internationalists think the function of an international law
textbook should be? Should it simply explain existing rules in the most neutral,
scientific way possible? Or should it also take a stand, denounce weaknesses in the
system as described, and suggest improvements?
French doctrine was divided on this point as early as the period between the two
World Wars. Some of those who were doctrinally close to positivism considered that
the role of the jurist is simply to present the current state of the rules in the most
impersonal manner possible. Others, on the contrary, following the natural law
tradition, wished to go beyond description to denounce the unjust effects of some rules.
Thus, for example, Edmond Giraud, a representative of the positivist perspective,
claimed that ''the role of the professor is essentially to make an exact, true and clear
statement of positive law, whatever his opinion of that law." 21 On the other hand,
Lou.isLe Fur considered that both legal good and evil exist and legal neutrality would
be s~cial abdication, rewarding injustice and violence. 22 Much later, Michel Virally
would similarly claim that "[t)he analysis of positive law appears impracticable
without an appreciation of the justice or injustice of its provisions. ,m
At first glance, a study of current French international law textbooks seems to
demonstrate that this quarrel has calmed and that the search for neutrality dominates
most of them. Does this mean that positivism has won this battle? Yes, as long as a
distinction is made, as suggested by Norberto Bobbio, between positivism as a "means

21. Edmund Giraud, Le droit positif. Ses rapports avec la philosophie et la politique, in MELANGES
BASDEVANT
222 (1960). Of course, Hans Kelsen's position on this subject is well known, affmning that
"legal science should not evaluate or judge, but rather provide a description unsullied by any values." Hans
Kelsen, Theorie du droit international public, 84 RECUEILDESCoURSI, 8 (1953). Kelsen (1881- I 973) was
an Austrian, subsequent U.S. national, and professor (Universities of Vienna, Cologne, Geneva, Harvard,
and Berkeley). His principal contributions to international law were Peace through law (1944), The Law
of the United Nations ( 1950), and Principles of international law ( 1952). Kelsen, who remains better known
and more influential on continental Europe applied something like Kant's Transcendental Argument to law.
The nonnative theory ofKelsen considers law as being made up ofa series ofnonns, ultimately deriving
their validity from a basic norm (Grund norm), and this basic norm is in turn presupposed by those seeing
legal order as nonnative. As a legal positivist, Kelsen does not mean to ground the normative force of his
basic norm on its moral validity, but makes his theory pure of sociological, moral, or practice-based
elements.
22. Louis Le Fur, La theorie du droit nature/ depuis le XVIle siecle et la doctrine moderne, 18 RECUEIL
DESCOURS259, 385 ( I927).
23. MICHELVIRALLY,LE DROITINTERNATIONAL EN DEVENIR67 (1990) (my translation). See also
Hersch Lauterpacht, Reg/es genera/es du droit de la paix, 62 RECUEILDES CoURS95, 177-82 (1937).
Hersch Lauterpacht's description of the tasks and problems of the science of international law includes the
critical examination of the reality of international obligations flowing from treaties and the adaptation of
traditional notions of international law to reflect progress in other areas of the law.
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of approaching legal studies" and positivism as a theory or as an ideology. 24 Indeed,
a positivist approach is recognized by the main international law textbooks.
Thus, Jean Combacau and Serge Sur acknowledge that their textbook "follows a
doctrinal continuum, that of legal positivism . . . . Just like the most rigorous internal
disciplines, international law is based on a technique. This work follows that technique because it best explains the concrete role oflaw in international practice .... " 25
For his part, Pierre-Marie Dupuy uses a "scientifically positive" approach, extolling
methodological positivism, "analyzing the international legal phenomenon, including
its most contemporary aspects, such as it is," which the author summarizes as "well
tempered scientific positivism." 26 The textbook by Alain Pellet and Patrick Daillier
participates in the rebirth of a form of positivism without dogmatic voluntarism, a
pragmatic positivism describing the state of positive law through a systematic
examination of all sources, case law as well as diplomatic practice. 27 Methodological
positivism is extolled in the name ofrefusing an ideological approach to law. Thus,
for example, Jean Combacau and Serge Sur denounce the fact that "international law
has often been the object of approaches that relate more to discourse about the law than
to a study of the law itself." 28 For their part, Patrick Daillier and Alain Pellet reject
the "legal militancy" of some textbooks, which aim to turn international law doctrine
into an instrument of political action, 29 whereas Pierre-Marie Dupuy states his intention
to describe the law "such as it is and not such as one may want it to be. " 30
This common intention to describe the law such as it is actually practiced is
clearly perceptible in the analysis of the relations between international and national
law. Indeed, the quarrel between monism and dualism seems to have lost the force and
dogmatism it showed in the period between the two World Wars. The positions taken
currently are more subtle. Even Alain Pellet and Patrick Daillier, who expressly
defend the monist concept of the pre-eminence of international law, acknowledge the
fact that in practice the two doctrines often lead to similar results, dualist countries
agreeing that international law is "part of the law of the land," and monist countries
requiring procedures for the introduction of international rules into internal law.31
Emmanuel Decaux sees the monism/dualism quarrel as "Manichean" and "generally
outdated. " 32

24. Norberto Bobbio (1909-2004) was Italy's leading legal and political philosopher (THE
PHENOMENOLOGICAL
TuRNIN SOCIALANDLEGALPIDLOSOPHY(I 934), THE USE OF ANALOGYIN LEGAL
LOGIC(1938), A THEORYOF JUDICIALNORMS (1958)). He elaborated a general theory of the practice and
validity of law and regarded the Kelsenian theory as missing the institutional context of law making. Law
and rights are conceived as a historical achievement belonging to a particular form of State. Bobbio
distinguishes three main senses of legal positivism: as a value free approach to law, as a legalistic theory
of law and State, and as an ideology of justice affirming the duty to obey the law as such. See NORBERTO
BOBBIO, IL POSITIVISMO
GIURIDICO( 1996).
25. COMBACAU& SUR, supra note 11, at v (my translation).
26. DUPUY, supra note 12, at 396,362 (my translation).
27. PELLET& DAILLIER,supra note 13, at 78, 80.
28. COMBACAU& SUR, supra note 11, at v (my translation).
29. PELLET& DAILLIER,supra note 13, at 81.
30. DUPUY, supra note 12, at 396 (my translation).
31. PELLET& DAILLIER,supra note 13, at 95.
32. DECAUX,supra note 14, at 67.
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Pierre-Marie Dupuy lists the limits of each theory taken in isolation and notes that
in theory, these relations are established largely on internal constitutional options
adopted by each State and, in practice, on the interpretation adopted by their courts. 33
The same observation is made by Combacau and Sur, leading them to the conclusion
that the monist option "is just a deviation, or even a modality of dualism. "34 Therefore,
the study of practice is fundamental and testifies to a realistic, neutral approach to the
law. Nevertheless, although the analysis of practice is similar and, in this case, leads
to the common observation that state constitutions offer a variety of solutions, the
theoretical consequences drawn by some authors are more diverse: the need for
monism claimed by Daillier and Pellet, the inevitability of dualism according to
Combacau and Sur.
This shows the difficulty, if not impossibility, of a totally neutral, scientific
approach to the law, given that it is not a precise science, admitting various interpretations and divergent practices. In addition, subjectivity is reintroduced in the textbooks
due to the practical need to make a selection among all the data collected, developing
some areas at the expense of others. Emmanuel Decaux admits this quite simply:
"[W]e have sought to bring out the essential elements, by insisting subjectively on a
number of major aspects that help to situate current issues in international law." 35
C. The Problem of the Scope of Analysis

In reality, the interpretation of objective data taken from practice inevitably passes
through the filter of the preconceived ideas that different authors have of the matter,
its limits and even its object, aims, and underlying nature. Michel Virally had already
issued a warning on this subject: "One does not seek to establish what the law is, but
what it should be, based on philosophical, methodological or even ideological
predispositions." 36 These substantive problems appear right from the start of the
analysis, when delimiting the scope of the relevant elements to be taken into account
during the study. Thus, different responses will be given to the question whether it is
necessary to include a consideration of the origins and aims oflaw in a description of
the legal phenomenon.
From a scientific viewpoint, one may be tempted to reply in the negative, because
these questions are likely to be influenced by the moral or religious convictions of the
authors. They introduce the study of values into the description of the law-values
that suffer from their relativity. Yet, if one prudently excludes these questions, the
resulting description may be incomplete, only describing the visible aspects of the
legal phenomenon. Thus, despite the same concern for realistic description of the law,
a postulate common to all authors, the responses may vary greatly, which explains the
diversity of French textbooks in this regard.
For Jean Combacau and Serge Sur, the search for scientific neutrality implies a
strictly technical approach to the law.37 Yet this is seen as insufficient by Patrick

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

DUPUY,supra note 12, at 407.
COMBACAU& SUR, supra note 11, at 181 (my translation).
DECAUX,supra note 14, at I (my translation).
VIRALLY,supra note 23, at 31 (my translation).
COMBACAU& SUR, supra note 11, at V.
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Daillier and Alain Pellet, who attempt to avoid "dogmatism" so as to remain in contact
with the realities of international life. 38 The technical approach must, therefore, be
complemented by a study of the social context. Pierre-Marie Dupuy also notes that,
from his perspective, it is not very scientific to exclude the social and historical
context, such as the finality of a rule, which allows reintroduction into the analysis of
considerations of justice or social necessity, at least when they are directly deduced
from the rule.39 He writes that "truly sociological data ... cannot be irrelevant to legal
analysis, if only because it has a direct impact on the technical aspects of the law.
Thus, the integration of an analysis of such data does not mean taking an ideological
approach or taking one's desires for reality.',4()
The last two approaches are in direct opposition to Kelsen's affirmation that:
[Pure theory] does not discount the fact that the content of all legal systems is
determined by historical, economic, moral and political factors, but .... [I]t leaves
it to the political, economic and historical sciences ... to explain why a particular
positive legal system has a particular content and not another ....
Indeed, the
knowledge of positive law is based on other principles than the knowledge of
historical and economic facts, or moral and political values .... 41

On the contrary, these definitions hark back directly to the preoccupations of the theory
of sociological objectivism, in their attempt to bring to light the substantive sources of
law constituted by social necessity. That the majority of French doctrine should be
favorable to this approach is not surprising given the heritage left by the philosophy
of Georges Scelle42 and Maurice Bourquin. 43 These differences in the scope of
analysis are not without effects and lead to important differences concerning the very
nature of international law.
III. OPPOSING CONCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Although not as vigorous or radical as the doctrinal disagreements during the
period between the two World Wars, the differences identified above are linked to the
objectivist versus voluntarist debate concerning the origin of international law and the
analogy with national law.

38. PELLET& DAJLLIER,supra note 13, at 77-78.
39. DUPUY,supra note 12, at IO.
40. Id. at 356 (my translation).
41. Kelsen, supra note 21, at 7 (my translation).
42. Georges Scelle (1878-1961), French public servant and professor (Dijon and Geneva). Principal
works: LE PACTEDESNATIONSETSALIAISONAVECLESTRAITESDEPAIX( I 919); PRECISDEDROITDESGENS
(1932 and 1934), 'fHEORIEET PRATIQUEDE LA FONCTIONEXECUTIVEEN DROITINTERNATIONAL
(1936).
Scelle's theory emphasized the material sources of international law, especially social necessity, and
predicted the growth of federalism as the inevitable consequence of the interdependence of nations. For
Scelle, the international world was already a society and possessed a hierarchical constitution.
43. Maurice Bourquin (1884-1961), born in Toumai, Belgium, a professor (Geneva), and diplomat at
the Societe des nations (League of Nations). Bourquin analysed law as a product of social life and
emphazised the interdependence of nations, but his doctrine is less dogmatic and systematic than Scelle's.
See generally Maurice Bourquin, Academie de droit international, in 35 RECUEILDESCOURS( 193 I).
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A. A Persistent Cleavage Between Positivism and Objectivism
The issue here is the conceptual framework through which the data collected will
be filtered and analyzed. Their classification, explanation, and the identification of
their meaning are based on theoretical predispositions that appear clearly in all the
textbooks considered. This is true of the voluntarist positivism in the textbook by
Jean Combacau and Serge Sur. Significantly, chapter two is entitled: "The origin of
international law: international commitment by the State." The authors explain that
''the criterion for the existence of a rule of international law resides ultimately in a
commitment by States with respect to it and the international obligations of each State
by virtue of its own commitment. This is the basis of all international law.''44 The
issue of origins having been so clearly resolved, questions regarding the social and
historical context become irrelevant, at least in the context of legal analysis, and the
strictly technical approach recommended by the authors is thus the most legally
relevant solution. On the contrary, the importance of the will of the state in the
creation of international law is minimized in Alain Pellet and Patrick Daillier's
textbook, which criticizes voluntarism for not taking account of the social context in
which law is formed. They note that, in reality, "a State that expresses its will acts
under the pressure of a specific economic and political necessity and within a given
social context.'>45
This explains the primary importance, recognized by these authors, of describing
sociological aspects. Developments concerning the social context underlying the
elaboration of a rule thus respond to a logical need. Accordingly, this is the textbook
that most clearly integrates the French heritage of sociological objectivism identified
by Georges Scelle 46 that sees law as the fruit of social necessity, the state simply
observing the objective, prior existence of the rule. The role of the state is thus
reduced to the simple function ofrecording the law. Although the authors' approach
is less systematic and dogmatic in this case, it is nevertheless directly influenced by
the "Scellian" philosophy. 47
Finally, Pierre-Marie Dupuy's textbook, while recognizing the essential role of
consent, argues that it is no longer possible ''to continue interpreting the most recent
means of rule creation ... using the conceptual framework that was used at the time
of the Lotus case.'>48 The author rejects, therefore, a strict voluntarist approach. In
practice, this textbook pays great attention to the social context of rule-making, which
is similar to the approach of sociological objectivism. It also attempts to study
normative goals, noting in particular that it appears "absolutely fundamental not to
forget that the United Nations Charter ... assigns specific goals to international society
as a whole.'>49 This attention to the aims of the rule, which may also be found in the

44. COMBACAU
& SUR, supra note 11, at 47 (my translation).
45. PELLET& DAILLIER,supra note 13, at 103 (my translation).
46. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
47. The authors do, however, keep a certain distance from Scelle and criticize his rejection of the
concept of sovereignty, which they regard as contradicted by the reality of international society. PELLET&
DAILLIER,supra note 13, at 106.
48. DUPUY,supra note 12, at 395 (my translation).
49. Id. at 356-57. In the Lotus case, S.S. Lotus(Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7),
the Permanent Court of International Justice decided whether Turkey could exercise criminal jurisdiction
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work of Dominique Carreau and Emmanuel Decaux, brings the author close to the
natural law movement, although in a non-dogmatic way and attentive to the realities
of international life, as extolled by Charles de Visscher, who relied on "human goals,
50
the basis of the international order," as "the ultimate reasons for the legal rule."

B. International Law: Primitive Law Still Being Perfected
or a Different Sort of Law?
In the final analysis, these differences concerning the scope of international law
explain the divergence between the authors. Indeed, they provide radically differing
replies to the following question: Is current international law still at a sort of primitive,
imperfect stage, requiring reliance on the centralized, state models to continue
improving, or, alternatively, does it have its own specific irreducible nature and
characteristics that render it impossible to compare the two systems? This comes
down to asking whether the international system will continue to apply the system
inherited from the Westphalian treaties, based on the sovereign state as the sole or
dominant subject of international law. Is its underlying principle a simple law of
coexistence between equal sovereignties or has it become an essentially cooperative
form of law, perhaps even the law of an emerging international community that will
eventually become centralized in the image of its constituent states?
The textbook by Jean Combacau and Serge Sur is clearly centered on the
permanence and dominant presence of the state. This appears in the preface, which
states that the book "is, above all, attentive to international law as produced and
51
This is in no
applied by States, which are both its source and essentials subjects."
way reduced by the emergence of international organizations which, except for the
52
specific case of the European Union, result from a "static interstate approach" and
have not become real players alongside their member states. They are thus treated as
53
"second level subjects, fundamentally subordinate to their creators. " The expression ·
"international community" is rarely used by these authors and always between inverted
commas, since it lacks the political homogeneity ''that would justify giving it an
54
institutional organization separate from that ofStates."
Beyond the absence of any institutional community, the authors also insist on the
weakness of the normative community. This explains their rather skeptical analysis
of jus cogens, seen as the fruit of a bygone epoch during which both new and socialist

over a French sea captain who collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas. Id. at 5. The court concluded
that no provisions of international law prohibited such jurisdiction and thus it was permissible. Id. at 30.
In a brief dictum, the court explained, "[t]he rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their
Restrictions upon the
own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted ....
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed." Id. at 18. The Lotus case is a significant example
of a voluntarist conception of international law. For some authors, this conception of international law is
still relevant.
50. CHARLESDE VISSCHER, THEORIES ET REALITESEN DROIT INTERNATIONALPUBLIC 153 (4th ed. 1970).
See also Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The European Tradition in International Law: Charles de Visscher, 11 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 871,873 (2000).
51. COMBACAU & SUR,supra note 11, at v.
52. Id. at 705.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 7 (my translation).
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states influenced the content of international law. The nature and real meaning ofjus
cogens were never clarified and its influence on international practice is questioned. 55
Similarly, the concept of an "international public order" is treated as a militant view
of international law that is far from being shared unanimously. This opinion is
developed during the study of collective countermeasures and the concept of
international crime. 56 This classic, Westphalian vision of international law emphasizes
its permanent aspects. The changes during the last few decades are thus seen as
quantitative rather than qualitative. International society is decentralized by nature and
has no reason to align itself on the centralized state model. The introduction of
concepts such as ''public order" or even, to a certain extent, the distinction between
civil and criminal law, is thus perceived as a perturbation because it counters a proved,
secular logic.
Adopting a nuanced dialectic approach, Pierre-Marie Dupuy traces the evolution
of international law, but also recognizes the contradictions which affect it. He
summarizes this tension as ''the relative progress ofinternational law." 57 Although the
"pre-eminence" of states is recognized, the author also insists on the "constants and
evolution of international law," which:
is still the law of coexistence between equal sovereignties, contributing to the
adjustment of their respective competence and competing pretensions. It equally
maintains to be the law of cooperation in a range of areas in constant expansion.
Finally, it is the law of the international community and Humanity, whose interests
it will be required to protect in the nascent century, or even guarantee their Survival.58

This even-handed vision is perceptible in Pierre-Marie Dupuy's study ofinternational
organizations. The author recognizes that, in many respects, they remain in strict
dependence on states. He also notes, however, that through the dynamics of their
operation, international organizations are forced to escape the tutelage of their
members 59 and thus acquire legal autonomy, eventually ending up "face to face with
States.''6° The theme of the "international community" is also analyzed as being one
of the "major axes of contemporary international law." 61 Although the ideological
connotations of the concept are recognized, the author demonstrates that it still has a
normative impact leading to an international public order. Nevertheless, he observes
that its effectiveness is limited by the absence of institutional centralization. 62 Human
rights and the issue of individual legal personality are considered to be one of the
major phenomena of contemporary international law, which "has probably displaced
the centre of gravity of the entire international legal system, even though this remained
imperceptible at first.''63 This vision is far from being static, or supportive of the
separate, inherently interstate nature of international law. It clearly shows the

55. Id. at 159.
Id at 215.
DUPUY,supra note 12, at 102 (emphasis omitted).
Id at 23 (my translation).
Id. at 146.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. at 26 (my translation).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
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dynamism of the system, although this dynamism is seen as challenged and its results
uncertain. There is no dogmatism, therefore, but no principled solution either.
Emmanuel Decaux notes a rupture with classic international law and points out
the dynamics of an international order searching for justice and peace. He defines
three stages in the evolution of international law in which contemporary international
law is placed under the sign of globalization, 64 that of an international society ''yet to
be" requiring a ''world organization above States.''65 This implies an ultimate stage of
evolution that does not go as far as envisaging a "superstate," but at least a high level
of centralization. Dominique Carreau's textbook also presents a dynamic perspective
on international law, the evolution of which seems to have accelerated since 1945.
The author stigmatizes old-fashioned, obsolete concepts of international law, which
are undergoing both horizontal and vertical transformation, integrating new actors and
new areas. This does not prevent the author, when comparing national and
international law, from noting that the latter is still marked by its inferiority and
weakness, especially in the domain of execution and control, and that it has serious
failings. 66 This textbook undoubtedly pushes furthest the comparison with national
law, taken as a paradigm.
Conversely, the Daillier-Pellet textbook places particular emphasis on the theme
of the international community. In fact, it is the title of the second section, which
underlines the progressive recognition of a certain legal personality of the international
community. 67 In particular, the authors note that the community does not yet enjoy the
capacity to exercise its rights directly. Accordingly, it is characterized as a minor
subject of international law.68 The creation of jus cogens, "a considerable legal
event," 69 is proof for the authors of the existence of an international public order. On
this subject, the authors assert that "[i]n establishing the written constitutional bases
of the international community, you have to start somewhere and this occurred with
the principle [ofjus cogens] adopted in the [Vienna] Convention.'' 70 This evolution
may still be far from complete, yet the dynamics of the international order and the
irresistible attraction of the national model are palpable, with the temptation to
organize international society along the lines of a superstate with its own constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Law of a naturally quasi-anarchic decentralized society, law of a society in full
mutation and affected by contradictory tensions, or even law of an emerging
international community? These are the fundamental fractures revealed by the study
of French internationalist doctrine through its main textbooks. These fractures can be
summarized in a few questions: Is the Lotus case view oflaw still relevant today? Is
it a purely interstate phenomenon based on consent or a product of social life the State

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

DECAUX,supra note 14, at 309.
Id. at 14.
CARREAU,
supra note 15, at 36.
PELLET& DAILLIER,supra note 13, at 401 (my translation).
Id. at 402.
Id. at 208.
Id. (my translation).
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can only record? Can one speak of progress in international law toward an international community?
The great diversity of answers given to these questions show that there exists no
"French school" of international law, apart from a common positivist methodology,
which is at least perhaps what really distinguishes French casebooks from American
casebooks. The debate about the foundations and goals of international law seems to
still endure in France.
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